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Neural Responses to Ambiguity Involve Domain-general
and Domain-specific Emotion Processing Systems
Maital Neta1, William M. Kelley2, and Paul J. Whalen2

Abstract
■ Extant research has examined the process of decision making

under uncertainty, specifically in situations of ambiguity. However, much of this work has been conducted in the context of
semantic and low-level visual processing. An open question is
whether ambiguity in social signals (e.g., emotional facial expressions) is processed similarly or whether a unique set of processors
come on-line to resolve ambiguity in a social context. Our work
has examined ambiguity using surprised facial expressions, as
they have predicted both positive and negative outcomes in the
past. Specifically, whereas some people tended to interpret surprise as negatively valenced, others tended toward a more positive interpretation. Here, we examined neural responses to social
ambiguity using faces (surprise) and nonface emotional scenes
(International Affective Picture System). Moreover, we examined

INTRODUCTION
Uncertainty is a prominent feature of our decision process (Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982), as it is ubiquitous in our realistic settings, and poses a major obstacle
to effective decision making (Brunsson, 1985; Corbin,
1980). Although such decision-making processes have
been studied for several decades (Tversky & Kahneman,
1974), we have only recently begun to understand the
neural architecture that allows for performing such a
complex task. A clear understanding of these cognitive
functions requires, then, also a clear definition of uncertainty. Whereas some describe this concept as a psychological state in which an individual lacks sufficient knowledge
about the outcome(s) of a given choice (see Platt &
Huettel, 2008, for a review), a more specific kind of uncertainty is derived from ambiguity. In large part, research on
ambiguity has been studied in the realm of linguistic properties, as ambiguity resolution is a central problem in language comprehension (Rodd, Davis, & Johnsrude, 2005;
see MacDonald, Pearlmutter, & Seidenberg, 1994, for a
review). More recently, work in neuroeconomics has compared the effects of risk (levels of probability) and ambiguity (uncertain probabilities) in the context of choice (Levy,
Snell, Nelson, Rustichini, & Glimcher, 2010; Hsu, Bhatt,
Adolphs, Tranel, & Camerer, 2005).
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whether these effects are specific to ambiguity resolution (i.e.,
judgments about the ambiguity) or whether similar effects would
be demonstrated for incidental judgments (e.g., nonvalence judgments about ambiguously valenced stimuli). We found that a distinct task control (i.e., cingulo-opercular) network was more
active when resolving ambiguity. We also found that activity in
the ventral amygdala was greater to faces and scenes that were
rated explicitly along the dimension of valence, consistent with
findings that the ventral amygdala tracks valence. Taken together,
there is a complex neural architecture that supports decision
making in the presence of ambiguity: (a) a core set of cortical
structures engaged for explicit ambiguity processing across stimulus boundaries and (b) other dedicated circuits for biologically
relevant learning situations involving faces. ■

Although this work has examined decision-making processes in the presence of ambiguity, it remains unclear how
this may differ from the process of resolving ambiguity (i.e.,
making a discrete decision about an ambiguous stimulus,
specifically along the dimension of the ambiguity). In other
words, an incidental judgment in the presence of ambiguity might require participants to judge the gender of faces
that have been morphed along the dimension of race,
whereas an explicit resolution judgment would require participants to judge the races of those same faces. Some studies have revealed that a set of cortical regions collectively
referred to as the cingulo-opercular network (dorsal ACC
[dACC]/medial superior frontal cortex and the bilateral
frontal operculum [FO]/anterior insula [AI]; see Dosenbach
et al., 2006) has been linked to decision making in the presence of semantic ambiguity (i.e., the selection between
competing alternatives; Thompson-Schill, DʼEsposito,
Aguirre, & Farah, 1997) and when detecting ambiguity in
visual motion (Sterzer, Russ, Preibisch, & Kleinschmidt,
2002). With respect to face processing, one study found
that these regions were more active only when participants
were asked to resolve the ambiguity (i.e., when making
race judgments about faces that are racially ambiguous
[morphed Asian and white faces] and gender judgments
about faces that are gender-ambiguous [morphed male
and female faces; Demos, Wig, Moran, & Kelley, 2004]).
One goal of the current work was to determine whether
certain aspects of the task demands specifically recruit this
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network, that is, when it is recruited by the mere presence
of ambiguity or when specifically making decisions that resolve the ambiguity.
To date, much of the work examining ambiguity has
been conducted in the context of semantic and low-level
visual processing. An open question is whether ambiguity
in social signals (e.g., emotional facial expressions) are
processed in a similar manner or whether a unique set
of processors come on-line to resolve ambiguity in an
emotional context. For example, surprised facial expressions are ambiguous in that they have predicted both
positive and negative outcomes in the past. In fact, this
ambiguity can be exploited to demonstrate that people
show individual differences in their propensity to interpret surprised faces as either positive or negative. In the
absence of contextual information that can be used to
disambiguate the valence of this expression, some people
interpret surprised faces negatively, whereas others interpret them positively (Neta & Whalen, 2010; Neta, Norris, &
Whalen, 2009; Kim, Somerville, Johnstone, Alexander, &
Whalen, 2003). The only known reports of neural responses to ambiguity of surprised faces has shown that
the amygdala is modulated by ambiguity but only in the
absence of a task that requires ambiguity resolution per
se (Kim et al., 2003, 2004). Taken together, the main goal
of this study was to examine ambiguity as it relates to social
signals, both in face and other nonface emotional stimuli
(i.e., International Affective Picture System [IAPS] scenes)
and to determine how task demands might modulate
responses to ambiguity (explicit valence ratings of ambiguously valenced stimuli, as compared with nonvalence
evaluations).
To this end, we examined behavioral and neural responses to ambiguous stimuli across two stimulus and
task categories. Specifically, we presented face stimuli
(surprised, angry, and happy expressions) as well as
scenes (ambiguous, clearly negative, and clearly positive)
and asked participants to make either a valence or nonvalence judgment about each one. In both stimulus categories, the clearly valenced stimuli were included purely
to serve as anchors for behavioral valence ratings of the
ambiguous stimuli. We predicted that there might be a
set of cortical regions that come on-line when effortful
processing of ambiguity is required (i.e., explicit valence
judgments of ambiguously valenced stimuli), whereas the
amygdala may play a dual role, in accordance with ventral
and dorsal subregions tracking valence and arousal, respectively, that may be critically dependent on the task
demands.

METHODS
Participants
Thirty-five healthy participants (right-handed, without
neurological disease, and with normal/corrected vision;
21 women) volunteered. None were aware of the purpose
548
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of the experiment, and they were all compensated for their
participation through monetary payment or course credit.
Written informed consent was obtained from each participant before the session, and all procedures were approved
by the Dartmouth College Committee for the Protection of
Human Subjects. Three participants were removed because
of technical complications with the stimulus-presenting
computer, and an additional participant was removed because of nonnormative ratings (e.g., happy expressions were
rated as negative on greater than 40% of trials). As a result,
the final sample contained 31 participants (19 women). All
included participants tested within normal limits for depression (Beck Depression Inventory [BDI]; Beck, Ward,
& Mendelson, 1961; M = 3.74, SE = .66) and anxiety
(Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene, 1988; State-Trait
Anxiety Inventory: STAIs = 31.06 ± 1.21, STAIt = 34.32 ±
1.43). One additional participant was removed from the
fMRI data analysis because of scanner-related artifact, so
the final sample for those analyses contained 30 participants
(18 women).
Stimuli
For the face task, we used 24 face identities (12 men) posing angry, happy, and surprised expressions. We selected
images of 14 identities (7 women, 7 men) from the NimStim
standardized facial expression stimulus set (Tottenham
et al., 2009) and 20 identities (10 women, 10 men) from
the averaged Karolinska Directed Emotional Faces database (Lundqvist, Flykt, & Öhman, 1998). Of the 34 individuals whose images were included in the experiment,
some posed all three expressions, and some posed only
one or two of the expressions, providing us with 48 discrete stimuli. The facial expressions in this stimulus set
have been validated by a separate set of participants who
labeled each expression; only faces correctly labeled more
than 60% of the time were included.
Importantly, not all of the identities are represented
in each expression condition. However, the focus of this
study was to assess the ambiguous conditions specifically
(faces and scenes), and the clearly valenced conditions
(e.g., happy and angry expressions) were included only
to serve as anchors that would ground participantsʼ responses to the ambiguous (e.g., surprised) stimuli. As
such, we used twice as many face identities in the surprise
condition compared with the angry and happy face conditions, and so, the conditions were never intended to be
matched for identity. Rather, we selected identities within
each expression condition that were labeled the most
accurately in terms of the normative data provided with
the stimulus set, so to ensure that our clearly valenced
faces were the ideal anchors (i.e., the most clearly valenced
stimuli we could present), and the same goal was applied
for the surprised faces.
For the scenes task, we used images from IAPS (Lang,
Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2008) that were previously rated as
either positive, negative, or ambiguous in valence. Ambiguity
Volume 25, Number 4

was based on discordant valence ratings across participants
(some rated images as positive and others as negative; i.e.,
high standard deviation in valence ratings; Table 1). The
mean (SEM) valence ratings on the normative 9-point scale
(1 = very unpleasant, 9 = very pleasant) were 2.39 (0.08)
for negative pictures, 7.93 (0.07) for positive pictures, and
5.19 (0.26) for ambiguous pictures (F(2, 10) = 1469.44,
p < .001), such that positive pictures were rated as more
positive than ambiguous and negative pictures, and negative
pictures were rated as more negative than ambiguous pictures (all ps < .001). Importantly, arousal was equated across
these three conditions: the mean (SEM) arousal ratings on
the normative 9-point scale (1 = low arousal, 9 = high
arousal) were 5.36 (0.20) for negative pictures, 4.96 (0.18)
for positive pictures, and 4.99 (0.18) for ambiguous pictures
(F(2, 10) = 1.56, p = .26; Table 1).
In a behavioral pilot, we recruited 20 new participants
(11 women). None were aware of the purpose of the experiment, and they were all compensated for their participation through monetary payment or course credit.
Written informed consent was obtained from each participant before the session, and all procedures were
approved by Dartmouth College Committee for the Protection of Human Subjects. Each participant viewed 114
scenes and rated each image as positive or negative
(consistent with the methods in Experiment 1). Of the
114 scenes, 24 were defined as clearly negative, 24 as
clearly positive, and 66 as ambiguous, based on the valence
and arousal ratings provided with the stimuli (Table 1).
Each image was presented for 1500 msec on a black background, with an intertrial interval of 500 msec, during
which a white fixation cross appeared on the screen. As
with the face stimuli, 24 images were used, and each participant viewed 50% ambiguous images and 50% clear
valence images (25% clear positive and 25% clear negative). Thus, from the data collected in the pilot, we selected 12 clearly negative and 12 clearly positive images
and 24 with an ambiguous valence (i.e., chosen because
they had the highest standard deviation in valence ratings
across participants). Indeed, the standard deviation in ratings of ambiguous scenes was significantly greater than
the standard deviation in ratings of clearly valenced scenes
(t(23) = 19.2, p < .001).
Finally, to directly compare the conditions across stimulus sets, we ran a Stimulus (IAPS, faces) × Valence (ambig-

uous, negative, positive) repeated-measures ANOVA on
the normative ratings associated with each stimulus set.
For valence ratings, we found a significant main effect of
Valence (as expected) but no main effect of Stimulus
( p > .2). For arousal ratings, however, there was a main
effect of Stimulus (F(1, 11) = 5.66, p = .04), where arousal
ratings were significantly higher for IAPS than faces, which
is somewhat expected given the nature of the stimuli.
Experiment Design and Parameters
The fMRI paradigm consisted of eight functional runs of
four experimental blocks each: two blocks each of facial
expressions and IAPS stimuli interleaved. Each block began
with a brief (2 sec) task instruction statement: “valence”
or “gender” (nonvalence) for the face blocks and “valence”
or “social/nonsocial” (i.e., “Does the picture contain a
person?”; nonvalence) for the IAPS blocks. Each block consisted of 24 images, 12 from the ambiguous conditions and
six from each clear valence condition (positive, negative).
All images were presented sequentially for 500 msec, with
an ISI of 1500 msec, in a randomized fashion for all conditions. An additional 24 trials were presented randomly
within each block to provide jitter, during which a white
fixation cross appeared on the screen, and 24 fixation trials
were presented between each block (Figure 1). The order
of the blocks was counterbalanced across participants.
During imaging, participants responded by pressing one
of two buttons with their dominant hand. Moreover, the
ratings of surprised faces on the valence task allowed for
the determination of positivity–negativity bias and RT.
Following each scanning session, participants also completed the following behavioral scales: BDI (Beck et al.,
1961) and the STAIs/STAIt (Spielberger et al., 1988).
Imaging Parameters
Images were acquired on a Philips Achieva 3.0-T scanner
(Philips Medical Systems, Bothell, WA), equipped with a
SENSE birdcage head coil. Anatomical T1-weighted images
were collected using a high-resolution 3-D magnetizationprepared rapid gradient-echo sequence, with 160 contiguous 1-mm thick sagittal slices (echo time = 4.6 msec,
repetition time = 9.8 msec, field of view = 240 mm, flip
angle = 8°, voxel size = 1 × 0.94 × 0.94 mm). Functional

Table 1. Results of Stimulus-matching Procedure for IAPS Scenes
Negative Pictures

Ambiguous Pictures

Positive Pictures

Mean (SEM ) valence

2.39 (0.08)

5.19 (0.26)

7.93 (0.07)

Mean (SEM ) arousal

5.36 (0.20)

4.99 (0.18)

4.96 (0.18)

Valence scores are based on the normative 9-point scale (1 = very unpleasant, 9 = very pleasant). There was a significant difference between
each condition of pictures (F(2, 10) = 1469.44, p < .001, η2 = .95), such that positive pictures were rated as more positive than ambiguous and
negative pictures, and negative pictures were rated as more negative than ambiguous pictures (all ps < .001).
Arousal was also based on the normative 9-point scale (1 = low arousal, 9 = high arousal ). Arousal was equated across these three conditions
(F(2, 10) = 1.56, p = .26, η2 = .10).
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Figure 1. A depiction of the
experimental design. The
paradigm consisted of eight
runs of four experimental
blocks each: two blocks each
of facial expressions and IAPS
stimuli interleaved. Each block
began with a brief (2000 msec)
instruction statement: “valence”
or “gender” (nonvalence) for
the face blocks and “valence” or
“social/nonsocial” (nonvalence;
i.e., “Does the picture contain
a person?”) for the IAPS
blocks. Each block consisted
of 24 images, 12 from the
ambiguous conditions (e.g.,
surprised faces) and six from
each clear valence condition
(positive, negative; e.g., happy and angry faces, respectively). All images were presented sequentially for 500 msec, with an ISI of 1500 msec, in a
randomized fashion for all conditions. An additional 24 trials were presented randomly within each block to provide jitter, during which a white fixation
cross appeared on the screen, and 24 fixation trials were presented between each block. The order of the blocks was counterbalanced across participants.

images were acquired using an echo-planar T2*-weighted
imaging sequence. Each volume consisted of 36 interleaved
3-mm thick slices, AC–PC aligned, with 0.5-mm interslice
gap (echo time = 35 msec, repetition time = 2000 msec,
field of view = 240 mm, flip angle = 90°, voxel size = 3 ×
3 × 3.5 mm). Despite our focus on the amygdala, we used
slices aligned with the AC–PC plane so that we could effectively interrogate whole-brain effects of processing ambiguity across stimulus and task categories.
fMRI Analysis
Processing of fMRI data took place in SPM2 ( Wellcome
Department of Cognitive Neurology, London, United
Kingdom). First, several preprocessing steps were employed to increase the signal-to-noise ratio before formation of statistical images. Slice time correction was
employed to correct for acquisition delays within functional volumes. Next, realignment corrected for participant
head motion within and across runs using rigid body transformation. Functional data then underwent unwarping,
which corrects for image distortions caused by movement by susceptibility interactions (Andersson, Hutton,
Ashburner, Turner, & Friston, 2001). Functional data were
normalized to the EPI.mnc template, which warped data
into Montreal Neurological Institute space. Normalized
functional data were then spatially smoothed (6-mm
FWHM) using a Gaussian kernel.
Next, the general linear model was performed to examine
separate task contributions to the fMRI signal. Surprised,
angry, and happy expressions as well as ambiguous, negative, and positive IAPS were modeled as separate task
regressors, which were convolved with a canonical hemodynamic response function. These task regressors were
included in a general linear model along with covariates
of noninterest (session mean, run regressor, linear trend,
and six movement parameters derived from realignment
550
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corrections) to compute parameter estimates (images containing weighted parameter estimates) for each comparison
at each voxel and for each participant.
Contrast maps were then entered into a random effects
model, which accounts for intersubject variability and
allows population-based inferences to be drawn. Parameter estimates for the ambiguous stimuli (i.e., surprised
faces and ambiguously valenced IAPS) were then submitted to a 2 × 2 ANOVA examining the effects of material
type (faces vs. IAPS) and task instruction (explicit valence
judgments vs. incidental non judgments). Brain regions
showing significant main effects in these analyses were extracted as ROIs (threshold: p < .001, as determined by
Monte Carlo simulations implemented in AlphaSim within
AFNI software [Cox, 1996] correcting for the whole brain).
Given the current studyʼs focus on the amygdala, we imposed a significance threshold of p < .05, corrected for multiple comparisons over the amygdala volume (∼4500 mm3,
defined using the Automated Anatomical Labeling atlas;
Maldjian, Laurienti, Kraft, & Burdette, 2003) and also determined by Monte Carlo simulations, a strategy we have implemented in previous studies (Davis, Johnstone, Mazzulla,
Oler, & Whalen, 2010; Kim et al., 2003, 2010; Johnstone,
Somerville, Alexander, et al., 2005).
ROI
ROI analyses were conducted using the MarsBaR tool within
SPM2 ( Wellcome Department of Imaging Neuroscience,
London, United Kingdom). Spherical regions (6-mm radius) were defined around each of these peak activations,
and all significant voxels ( p < .001) were included. Signal
intensities for each ROI were then calculated separately for
each task comparison (i.e., ambiguously valenced faces and
IAPS, for the valence and nonvalence tasks separately) and
examined statistically using repeated-measures ANOVA.
Then, the BOLD signal (beta weights) from the significantly
Volume 25, Number 4

activated voxels was extracted from each ROI for each
participant and submitted for off-line testing.

RESULTS
Behavioral Results
Valence Ratings
Angry and happy expressions were rated as consistently
negative (95.2% of trials) and positive (93.1% of trials), respectively. Figure 2A shows that these same participants
differed in their tendency to interpret surprised faces
negatively versus positively. As a manipulation check of
the valence conditions (ambiguously, as compared with
clearly valenced stimuli), a Stimulus (IAPS, faces) × Valence
(ambiguous, negative, positive) repeated-measures ANOVA

Figure 3. RTs (mean ± standard error) are greater when rating
the valence of ambiguous stimuli, as compared with an incidental
nonvalence rating, and they were also greater for the ambiguous
scenes than faces.

revealed a significant main effect of Valence (F(2, 29) =
1576.1, p < .001), and pairwise comparisons (LSD corrected) revealed that negative stimuli were rated as more
negative than ambiguous stimuli, which were rated as
more negative than positive stimuli ( ps < .001). Importantly, there was a significant positive correlation in ratings
of ambiguous IAPS and faces (r = .50, p = .005; Figure 2B),
such that participants who tended to interpret surprised
faces as positive also tended to interpret ambiguous IAPS
as positive.
RT
A Stimulus (IAPS, faces) × Task (valence, nonvalence)
repeated-measures ANOVA revealed a significant main
effect of Stimulus (F(1, 30) = 7.3, p = .011), and pairwise
comparisons (LSD corrected) revealed that participants
took longer to rate the IAPS, as compared with the face
stimuli (Figure 3). A significant main effect of Task (F(1,
30) = 295.3, p < .001) revealed that RTs were longer during the valence as compared with the nonvalence task.
There was no significant Stimulus × Task interaction
( p > .7).
Questionnaire Data
As noted in the Methods section, we administered personality and trait measure scales to document that these
participants fell within a healthy psychiatric range on certain measures (i.e., depression, anxiety) across all participants. Results indicated that all scores for depression
(BDI) and anxiety (STAI) were within normal limits.
Figure 2. Individual differences in rating valence of surprised expressions
and ambiguous scenes. (A) Consistent with previous work, angry faces
are rated consistently negative, happy faces are consistently positive,
and surprised ratings vary from negative to positive, revealing individual
differences in how people interpret the valence of these expressions.
(B) There was a significant positive correlation between ratings for
ambiguous faces and scenes. Individuals who tended to rate surprised
faces as positive also tended to rate the ambiguous IAPS scenes as positive.

fMRI Results
A voxelwise whole-brain 2 × 2 repeated-measures ANOVA
on the ambiguous trials with the factors of Stimulus (IAPS,
faces) and Task (valence, nonvalence) revealed brain regions showing a main effect of Stimulus, a main effect of
Neta, Kelley, and Whalen
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Task, and an interaction between Stimulus and Task in response to ambiguity (Table 2). To explore the directionality
of each effect, regions identified in the statistical F maps
were examined further using ROI analyses. It should be
noted that when RTs were regressed out, none of the reported effects changed.

Table 2. Brain Regions Identified as Responding to Ambiguous
Stimuli
x

y

z

F

Region

Main Effect of Stimulus (Faces vs. Scenes)

Brain Regions Preferentially Sensitive to Stimulus
The main effect of Stimulus revealed activations in inferior
temporal cortex, with a peak on the bilateral medial fusiform
gyrus (x, y, z: left = −33, −39, −21; right = 33, −36, −21;
main effects of Stimulus, left: F(1, 29) = 191.0, p < .001;
right: F(1, 29) = 126.3, p < .001). ROI analyses revealed that
activity here was greater for the IAPS stimuli than the face
stimuli (Figure 4). Many of the other regions that showed
a main effect of Stimulus (Table 2) revealed a similar pattern
(i.e., greater activity for IAPS than faces), with the exception
of the right ACC (x, y, z = 3, 36, 6; main effects of stimulus:
F(1, 29) = 45.8, p < .001) and the right inferior frontal gyrus (x, y, z = 57, 12, 24; main effects of Stimulus:
F(1, 29) = 14.7, p = .001), which showed greater activity
for the faces than the IAPS stimuli. Of these regions, only
the latter one also showed a main effect of Task (F(1, 29) =
11.6, p = .002), with a preferential response to the valence,
as compared with the nonvalence task. None of these
regions showed a significant interaction ( p > .1).

−33

−39

−21

364.66

Left fusiform gyrus

33

−36

−21

201.71

Right fusiform gyrus

3

36

6

37.0

Right ACC

−6

45

15

23.78

Left ACC

−3

−42

39

32.61

Left dACC

57

12

24

28.14

Right inferior frontal gyrus

−6

39

54

38.92

Left medial superior frontal gyrus

Brain Regions Preferentially Sensitive to Task

−36

18

57

27.70

Left superior frontal gyrus

−51

18

−30

26.70

Left superior temporal gyrus

−57

−3

−21

34.26

Left middle temporal gyrus

54

−6

−27

38.48

Right inferior temporal gyrus

−27

−90

33

97.35

Left superior occipital gyrus

−39

−84

9

170.36

Left middle occipital gyrus

36

−84

18

124.58

Right middle occipital gyrus

The main effect of Task revealed activity in the bilateral AI/FO
(left = −31, 21, −3; right = 36, 21, −3; main effects of task,
left: F(1, 29) = 38.9, p < .001; right: F(1, 29) = 49.1, p <
.001) as well as in the dACC (x, y, z = 0, 18, 48; main effect
of Task: F(1, 29) = 49.8, p < .001; Figure 5A). ROI analyses
in all of the regions that showed a main effect of Task (Table 2)
revealed that activity here was greater for the explicit valence
judgment task than the nonvalence (gender and social) task
for both categories (faces and scenes, respectively). Moreover, the left AI/FO and the left inferior frontal gyrus also
showed a main effect of Stimulus (F(1, 29) = 12.5, p =
.001; F(1, 29) = 15.6, p < .001; respectively), with a preferential response to the IAPS than face stimuli. Several of these
regions, including the dACC, showed a significant interaction of Stimulus and Task (F(1, 29) = 5.4, p = .03), where
there was a preferential response to the IAPS, but only
during the nonvalence task.
Finally, with a lower significance threshold (see fMRI
Analysis), we found a region of ventral amygdala (x, y,
z = −12, −3, −21) also showed a main effect of Task.
An ROI analysis was used to examine Stimulus (IAPS,
faces) × Task (valence, nonvalence) effects. We confirmed
this main effect of Task (F(1, 29) = 10.6, p = .003), but no
other main effects or interactions were significant ( ps >
.2). Like the other regions showing a main effect of Task,
there was greater activity here for the valence task as compared with the nonvalence task (Figure 5B).1

Main Effect of Task ( Valence vs. Nonvalence)
0

18

48

69.82

Medial superior frontal cortex

6

30

27

35.09

Right dACC

42

24

−9

47.56

Right FO

−30

21

−3

46.84

Left insula

45

6

36

34.42

Right inferior frontal gyrus

−54

18

6

43.33

Left inferior frontal gyrus

−30

51

9

24.26

Left middle frontal gyrus

30

48

18

15.07

Right superior frontal gyrus

48

−42

0

18.51

Right middle temporal gyrus

−12

−78

6

18.42

Left cuneus

12

−75

9

18.76

Right cuneus

Stimulus × Task Interaction
−30

−63

33

21.78

Left middle occipital gyrus

−39

−54

48

17.61

Left inferior parietal lobule

−6

51

21

16.89

Left medial frontal gyrus
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Brain Regions Exhibiting an Interaction of
Stimulus and Task
Three distributed cortical regions demonstrated a crossover interaction, including the left middle occipital gyrus
Volume 25, Number 4

Figure 4. Brain regions active
for the main effect of stimulus.
Activity in the bilateral ventral
temporal cortex was greater for
the IAPS, as compared with the
face stimuli.

(x, y, z = −30, −63, 33; interaction: F(1, 29) = 16.0, p =
.001), the left inferior parietal lobule (x, y, z = −39, −54,
48; interaction: F(1, 29) = 17.8, p < .001), and the left
medial frontal gyrus (x, y, z = −6, 51, 21; F(1, 29) = 11.3,
p = .002; Figure 6).

DISCUSSION
The neural architecture for responding to ambiguity relies,
in part, on cognitive control processing that is recruited
when participants make a judgment that requires the resolution of ambiguity. We found that activity in regions

Figure 5. Brain regions active for the main effect of task. (A) Three task control regions, comprising the cingulo-opercular network, showed
greater activity during the valence task, as compared with the nonvalence task (gender judgment for face stimuli, social judgment for IAPS scenes).
(B) A region of ventral amygdala showed greater activity to ambiguous stimuli during the valence task.
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Figure 6. Brain regions
exhibiting an interaction of
stimulus and task include (A)
left medial frontal gyrus, (B) left
inferior parietal lobule, and (C)
left middle occipital gyrus.

comprising a task control network (i.e., cingulo-opercular
network) provides a central part of this architecture, as it
also has been shown to play a crucial role in processing
ambiguity in other domains (i.e., linguistic, low-level perception). This domain-general processing is consistent
with our behavioral results that demonstrated that individual differences in the bias to resolve ambiguity positively or
negatively were correlated across the stimulus boundaries
(i.e., the same participants who showed a positive bias
when resolving ambiguity of facial expressions showed a
similar positive bias when resolving ambiguity in scenes).
Finally, we found that activity in the ventral amygdala was
greater to faces and scenes that were rated explicitly along
the dimension of valence, consistent with findings that the
ventral amygdala tracks valence (Whalen et al., 2009; Kim
et al., 2003). Here, we discuss the implications of these
findings, specifically in the context of task control and
specific emotion processing systems.
The Function of the Cingulo-opercular Network
A meta-analysis of 10 different tasks showed that three
cortical regions, comprising the cingulo-opercular network (dACC and the bilateral AI/FO), showed three distinct types of task-control signals: (1) signals tied to the
start of a task, which are likely related to the instantiation of task parameters; (2) activity sustained at a constant level across the task period, which likely reflects
maintenance of those parameters; and (3) error-related
activity, which is likely related to performance feedback (Dosenbach et al., 2006). Thus, this network has
been referred to as a “core” task set system (Dosenbach
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et al., 2006, 2007), which is thought to be involved in
controlling task performance through the stable maintenance of task parameters, as well as making and monitoring choices in accordance with those parameters (see
Dosenbach, Fair, Cohen, Schlaggar, & Petersen, 2008, for
a review).
Aside from these higher-order cognitive functions,
there are widely replicated findings implicating the dACC
in conflict monitoring (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, &
Cohen, 2001; Miller & Cohen, 2001). Moreover, the AI
shows transient responses related to electrodermal arousal
(Critchley, Elliott, Mathias, & Dolan, 2000), empathy
(Singer et al., 2004), the generation of subjective feelings
and integration of sensory inputs (see Medford & Critchley,
2010, for a review), and other socioemotional processing
(Chang, Smith, Dufwenberg, & Sanfey, 2011; Sanfey, Rilling,
Aronson, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2003; Lane, Fink, Chua, &
Dolan, 1997). This region is also shown, via resting state
functional connectivity (see Dosenbach et al., 2007; Fox,
Corbetta, Snyder, Vincent, & Raichle, 2006; Fox et al.,
2005) to coactivate with the dACC as part of a network
that is nonspecifically involved in general goal-directed
cognition (Chang, Yarkoni, Khaw, & Sanfey, 2012; Yarkoni,
Poldrack, Nichols, Van Essen, & Wager, 2011; Dosenbach
et al., 2006). Thus, task-related manipulations (e.g., conflict monitoring) that drive activity in one of these regions
(dACC) is likely to also affect activation in the others
(bilateral AI), providing further evidence that these regions
comprise a network or system that is implicated in many
instances requiring attentional resources or task control
(see also Nee, Wager, & Jonides, 2007; Duncan & Owen,
2000, for meta-analyses of cognitive control paradigms).
Volume 25, Number 4

As such, although the dACC and AI are independently
implicated in specific processes (e.g., conflict monitoring,
generating subjective feelings), the specific role of these
regions likely lies in the domain of general task control. In
other words, many different task demands are likely
to require an ability to sustain attention, monitor task
parameters, and modulate arousal (Nelson et al., 2010;
Dosenbach et al., 2006), but this does not indicate that
the specific role for these regions is to, for example, generate subjective feelings.

A Role for the Cingulo-opercular Network
in Ambiguity
We found increased activity in this network in response to
surprised faces and ambiguous IAPS, but only when making judgments that require the resolution of ambiguity.
This network has been shown to respond to ambiguity
in semantic (Thompson-Schill et al., 1997), visual motion (Sterzer et al., 2002), and face processing (Demos
et al., 2004) paradigms. This is consistent with the notion
that these regions are recruited during tasks where a
stimulus–response mapping needs to be made concerning the ambiguous stimulus. In other words, ambiguity is
defined here as something that can be interpreted in more
than one way and, in turn, requires a selection between
competing alternatives. Research in neuroeconomics has
demonstrated a link between the AI and ambiguity in decision making, particularly in situations that require behavioral flexibility that is dependent on contextual analysis
(Huettel, Stowe, Gordon, Warner, & Platt, 2006), although
ambiguous decisions (multiple possible outcomes with
unknown probabilities) are made more quickly than risky
decisions (multiple possible outcomes with known probabilities). In other words, as in our own data showing that
these regions were still active during explicit valence judgments even when RT was regressed out, activity in this
network seems to be unrelated to time on task (see also Neta,
Schlaggar, & Petersen, under revision, but see Grinband
et al., 2011).
Recent work on perceptual recognition found that activity in the AI/FO region remained near baseline until the
moment of recognition, suggesting a relation to the moment of the decision itself (Ploran et al., 2007). Similarly,
the dACC was shown to learn from experiences by monitoring and integrating outcomes (Behrens, Woolrich,
Walton, & Rushworth, 2007), playing a crucial role in
the update (late) period of such decision making, not
during the initial computation of uncertainty (see Singer,
Critchley, & Preuschoff, 2009, for a review). These findings suggest that these regions may not be involved in
the process of deciding how to resolve ambiguous stimuli, but rather, they are crucial at the point during which
ambiguity is resolved per se. Taken together, these data
support the notion that activity in the cingulo-opercular
network is not simply related to task difficulty, and we

propose that this activity is most readily observed in tasks
that (1) require a decision relevant to the ambiguity (i.e.,
valence) and (2) require resolution rather than simple
detection or perception of ambiguity. Future work can
investigate how these transient responses to ambiguity
relate to the transient error-related activity identified in
the same regions (Neta et al., under revision).

Limitations
We note several limitations in interpreting the present findings. First, the IAPS stimuli were significantly more arousing than the face stimuli. As noted in the Methods section,
this is somewhat expected given the nature of these stimulus categories, where the IAPS scenes carry much more
information than individual facial expressions. Given this
effect, the brain regions that were found to show a main
effect of stimulus may be, at least in part, modulated by this
difference in arousal. However, we focus here predominantly on the main effects of task, which is not impacted
by these arousal effects.
Second, although we compared two stimulus categories,
one of individual facial expressions and another that represents nonface emotional stimuli (IAPS scenes), we note
that approximately half of our scenes contained (at least
part of ) faces and human forms. As such, the present data
showing similar neural responses to ambiguity between
these two stimulus sets might still require a social element,
and the present result can be mostly cautiously summarized by saying that this network was similarly involved in
processing ambiguity to directly presented faces and other
faces within more complex social scenes.
Finally, based on previous work showing that a region of
the dorsal amygdala tracks surprised faces during passive
viewing (Kim et al., 2003), we predicted that this region
would show greater activity to stimuli with an ambiguous,
as compared with clear valence, and that this effect might
be modulated by task demands. Indeed, this would fit well
with nonhuman animal work implicating the amygdala in
associative orienting, meaning that it functions to alert
other brain areas in instances of uncertainty when there
is a greater amount to learn (Gallagher, Graham, &
Holland, 1990; Kapp, Frysinger, Gallagher, & Haselton,
1979). However, we did not find a region of dorsal amygdala in the omnibus ANOVA in the current study. It could
be that our task manipulation did not allow for the sensitivity to pick up on the amygdala response to ambiguity
in the implicit nonvalence task (as our previous work has
demonstrated such an effect only for passive viewing). Indeed, meta-analyses have demonstrated that amygdala responses to emotional stimuli can be diminished during an
active task, as compared with passive viewing (Costafreda,
Brammer, David, & Fu, 2008). Future work might help to
disentangle these effects by directly comparing passive
viewing to responses during both explicit and implicit
evaluations of ambiguous stimuli.
Neta, Kelley, and Whalen
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Conclusions
The brain regions that were recruited while making a valence
judgment about ambiguously valenced stimuli (i.e., the
cingulo-opercular network, ventral amygdala) were active
for both the ambiguous faces (surprised expressions) and
scenes. Moreover, the bias with which people resolve
ambiguity is consistent across these categories of stimuli.
Thus, the neural and behavioral responses required when
resolving ambiguity transcends stimulus boundaries and
is better defined by an uncertainty in stimulus–response
mapping that is created when people are required to make
a selection between competing alternatives. At a weaker
threshold, a targeted analysis of the amygdala based on
previous data showed that the dorsal amygdala showed
the highest response to surprised faces, but only during
the nonvalence task. Together, these data suggest that,
although some of the domain-general processes that come
on-line in the “face” of ambiguity are similar across many
categories of ambiguity (faces and scenes in the present
work; semantic, visual motion, and economic decisionmaking ambiguity in previous work), there may be other
dedicated circuits for some social and emotional ambiguity
and, specifically, for biologically relevant learning situations
involving faces.
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Note
1. Given our previous demonstrations of amygdala responses
to ambiguous facial expressions during passive viewing (Davis
et al., 2010; Whalen et al., 2009; Kim et al., 2003), we predicted
that there would be a dorsal amygdala response to ambiguity
that was also modulated by task demands but may be limited
to face stimuli. Accordingly, a small volume correction (see
fMRI Analysis) revealed a region in the dorsal amygdala (x, y,
z = −24, −3, −9) that was more active for surprised as compared with clearly valenced expressions, only for the nonvalence task. This effect was not observed for the IAPS at this
more liberal threshold.
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